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NOTES AND COMMENTS
defendant claimed his letter was in answer to the plaintiff's. Held,
for defendant. In case of mutual vituperation neither party can recover damages. Kenner v. Milner, 196 So. 535 (La. 1940).
The prevailing view in United States and England grants defamed persons a qualified privilege to answer defamatory charges.
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 594, comment i; HARPER, TORTS (1933)
§249; cf. Toogood v. Spyring, 1 C.M. & R. 181, 193, 149 Eng. Rep. R.
1044, 1049 (Ex. 1834). Where the answer is published fairly as an
answer, without malice, and for the purpose of repelling the charge,
it is privileged although it is false. Duncan v. Record Publishing Co.,
131 S.C. 483, 127 S.E. 606 (1925); Clffin v. Lynch, 83 Va. 106, 1
S.E. 803 (1887), 84 Va. 884, 6 S.E. 474 (1888); Laughton v.. Bishop
of Sodor and Man, 9 Moore P.C.C. (N.S.) 318, 17 Eng. Rep. R. 534
(P.C. 1872). If the answer is unconnected with the plaintiff's charge
the defendant has exceeded his privilege. Brewer v. Chase, 121 Mich.
526, 80 N.W. 575, 46 L.R.A. 397 (1899). This problem seems analagous
to the assault and battery situation where the defendant can resist
plaintiff's attack with only so much force as is necessary for his defense. Several jurisdictions, including federal courts, have allowed
evidence of plaintiff's previous libel only to mitigate plaintiff's damages. Shattuc v. McArthur, 29 Fed. 136 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1886); Stewart
v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 41 Minn. 71, 42 N.W. 787 (1889); Xavier
v. Oliver, 80 App. Div. 292, 80 N.Y.S. 225 (1903).
This is limited
further by refusing even mitigation where a considerable period of
time has elapsed. Battel v. Wallace, 30 Fed. 229 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887) ;
Keller v. American Bottlers' Publishing Co., et al., 140 App. Div. 311,
125 N.Y.S. 212 (1910). The unique Louisiana rule that neither party
can recover in case of mutual vituperation had its beginning in a
slander case. Fulda v. Caldwell, 9 La. Ann. 358 (1854). There the
court asserted, as the basis for its decision, "It is not fit that such
cases as this record presents should be brought before the courts."
Later, in Bigney v. Van Benthuysen et al., 36 La. Ann. 38 (1884), the
rule was extended to libel actions. In that case the court relied upon
a quotation from ODGERS, LIBEL AND SLANDER (1st ed. 1881) 228, (6th
ed. 1929) 240, that "a man, who himself commences a newspaper war,
can not subsequently complain because he has the worst of the fray."
The court apparently ignored a subsequent qualifying sentence that,
"The privilege extends only to such retorts as are fairly an answer
to the plaintiff's attacks." The principal case, however, reaffairms
earlier Louisiana decisions, but is opposed to the established rule in
other jurisdictions. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 594, comment i.
J.L.F.

TRADE REGULATION
PRICE FIXING AGREEMENTS AND THE SHERMAN ACT
United States v Socony Vacuum Oil Co., reaffirms the hostile
attitude of the United States Supreme Court toward any combination
tampering with competitive prices. The Court pronounced illegal per
%310 U.S. 150 (1940).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
se cooperative efforts of several major oil companies, distributing over
eighty per cent of all gasoline in the indictment area, to remove distress gasoline2 accumulated due to adverse economic conditions in the
oil industry. The oil companies had agreed informally to purchase
surplus gasoline from independent refiners on the spot market at the
fair market price. Such a buying program made possible the control
of retail and tank car prices of gasoline which followed the spot market quotations.
A literal application of the Sherman Acts supported by the reasoning of early cases would clearly outlav the oil companies buying
program since every combination in restraint of trade would be illegaL
But Standard Oil Co. v. United States,5 an integrated-combinations
injunction case, abandoned this illegal at law approach. 7 An illegal
in facts concept of reasonableness of restraint was there declared the
true basis of legality. Later, in a criminal prosecution, an express
agreement directly fixing prices was found unreasonable as a matter
of law and declared illegal per se in United States v Trenton'Potteries
Go.9 It was concluded that criminal liability should not turn upon
2 Gasoline which the refiners could not store, for which they had no

regular sales outlet and which therefore had to be sold for whatever price it would bring. Such sales drove the market down.
June 1, 1933, the price of crude oil was 25 cents a barrel; the
tank car price of regular gasoline was 2 5/8 cents per gallon.
826 STAT 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1934): (1) "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . is declared to be illegal."
'United States v Trans-Missour4 Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290
(1897); United States v Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505
(1898).
5 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (Combination was by stock ownership through a
holding company).
Accord, United States v American Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Nash v United States, 229 U.S. 373
(1913). In the Standard Oil case, White, C. J. concludes that only
unreasonable restraints were illegal at common law. The accepted
view is contrary. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v United States,
175 U.S. 211 (1899); Buckelew v Martens, 108 N.J. 339, 156 AtI.
436 (1931).
For a general discussion of price-fixing and an
argument for application of the rule of reasonableness see, Jaffee
& Tobriner, The Legality of Price-Fixing Agreements (1932) 45
Harv. L. Rev. 1164.
GBy integrated combinations is meant those where restraint of commerce is from possession or acquisition of property rights. Mergers, consolidations, and acquisition of stock or assets are examples.
In contrast are loose combinations which embrace all instances
where concerns not linked together by common property interests
agree to suppress competition among themselves or agree to unite
in imposing restrictions upon activities of third persons.
7
Illegal at law means issue of reasonableness is an issue of law to be
decided by the court and not the jury.
8
Illegal in fact means issue of reasonableness is an issue of fact to be
decided by jury or by court if jury trial waived.
9273 U.S. 392, 50 A.L.R. 989, 1000 (1927) (Eighty-two percent of the
pottery manufacturers and distributors had agreed upon a definite
sale price). Cf. Chicago Board of Trade v United States, 246

NOTES AND COMMENTS

so uncertain a test as the reasonableness of prices. In Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v United States,o however, where an exclusive selling agency was created with power to negotiate selling prices but without
power to exact monopoly prices no unreasonable restraint was found.
The existence of distress coal 11 and the presence in the industry of
demoralizing and injurious practices influenced the court's decision.
The two latter cases were the basis of the rival contentions of the
opposing parties in the Socony Vacuum case.
With these and other authorities available the Supreme Court
chose to rely upon the Trenton Potteries case to declare illegal the oil
companies buying program. Thus the same principle of law is extended to combinations having the purpose and power to raise prices
even though the means by which control is obtained is other than an
&
express agreement to fix uniform prices.1
2 Prior decisions indicated
that where capital is risked in combination such centralized control
will be permitted.1s But in the S.ocony Vacuum case capital was risked
by cooperating in the purchase of surplus gasoline in the spot market,
yet the court applied the same illegal per se rule as where the combination controlled price without the risk of capital. An activity now
seems to constitute price-fixing whenever an agreement to interfere
with market forces is successful. 14 That retail and tank car prices
U.S. 231 (1918) (The court concludes that the test of illegality
is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps promotes competition or whether it suppresses or destroys it).
% 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (Prices were fixed. by officers of the company
but the Court concluded that the mere fact that the parties to an
agreement eliminate competition between themselves is not enough
to condemn it. It was deemed necessary to consider economic conditions peculiar to the coal industry and consequences of the plan).
Cf. Sugar Institute Inc. v United States, 2971 U.S. 553 (1936)
(The basic agreement of sugar refiners was to sell only upon
prices and terms openly announced. There was an advance announcement of prices with " moves." The Court did not dissolve the
Institute but restrained it from carrying out its open price plan
so as to compel uniform prices). Handler, The Sugar Institute
Case and the Present Status of the Anti-Trust Laws (1936) 36
Col.L.Rev. 1.
" Coal shipped to the market which was unsold at the time of delivery and therefore dumped on the market irrespective of demand.
12
This extension was anticipated. Weston, The Application of the
Shermna Act to Integrated and Loose Industrial Combinations
(1910) 7 Law & Contemp. Prob. 42. It had been pointed out in
Appalachian Coal case that the antitrust law aims as substance
rather than form.
1
s Integrated and loose industrial combinations have received different
treatment by the courts. See Weston, supra note 12, at 42.
14
The Court in the Socony Vacuum case states that "prices are fixed
within the meaning of the Trenton Potteries case if the range
within which purchases or sales will be made is agreed upon, if
the prices paid or charged are to be at a certain level or on ascending or descending scales, if they are uniform, or if by various
formulae they are related to the market prices." Cf. the statement in the Appalachian Coals case that "mere fact that the
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depended upon competitive prices in the spot market is expressly denied as a defense. 15 The buying program is apparently considered
direct price-fixing.16 The means are declared immaterial.
It is well established that the purpose of the Sherman Act is to
preserve competition.17 But the aim and result of every effective
price-fixing combination is to eliminate one form of competition. s
The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, is said
to involve power to control the market.19 This is especially true in
gasoline since it is a highly standardized product, refined and sold
by octane rating. All substantial competition in gasoline sales is in
price variations and to sanction the oil companies buying program
would as a practical matter remove that competition. 20 Such competition must exist if fair competition is to endure.21
The fact? that prosecution is during a period of falling prices
was thought important since the Appalachian Coals case.22 But the
sweeping words of the Socony Vacuum ease that "any combination
tampering with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activity3 '
now indicates a contrary view.23 Nor is the fact that combination
24
was to eliminate competitive evils a defense.
parties to an agreement eliminate competition between themselves
is not enough to condemn it."
15 United States v Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220 (1940).
Such a conclusion seems contra to that of Appalachian Coals case
where it is emphasized that competitive opportunities will still
exist in all markets.
26 Mr. Chief Justice Hughes dissenting in Apex Hosiery Co. v Leader,
310 U.S. 469, 514 (1940) indicates that Socony Vacuum case was
considered by the Court to involve direct price-fixing.
'17 United States v American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923) ; United
States v Mac Andrews Forbes Co., 149 Fed 823 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1906); Jaffe & Tobriner supra note 5, at 1164.
18 This was emphasized in the Trenton Potteries case.
19 United States v Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
The
validity oA this assumption has been challenged. See Jaffe &
Tobriner supra note 5, at 1164.
201n Sugar Institute case it was recognized that standardization of
sugar made sales depend almost entirely upon prices, terms, and
conditions.
21 Sugar Institute Inc. v United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936)
(The
court recognized that competition in sugar was in price rather
than brand).
22That Applachian Coals Inc. was formed in a period of falling prices
is suggested as a rationale to partially account for the difference
in decision between Applachian Coals case and Sugar Institute
case where the illegal combination operated in a period of rising
prices. See Weston, supra note 12, at 42.
2 United States v Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
24United States v Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220 (1940).
Cf. Applachian Coals Inc. v United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933);
National Association of Window Glass Mfgrs. v United States, 263
U.S. 403 (1923) (no unreasonable restraint of trade was found
where arrangements were made to meet the short supply of men).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Socony "Vacuumdecision preserves the form of the Standard Oil
case and the "rule of reason", but gets the result of the earlier cases.' 5
The dictum of the case is stronger. It denies that the "rule of reason"
was ever applicable to price-fixing combinations. 25 In those pricefixing cases where its application was attempted, efforts were to test
the reasonableness of specific prices. 27 Reasonableness should not,
however, be determined by such a test, but by whether the entire restraint is reasonable. 25 It is settled that restraint is not reasonable
where there is substantial interference with competition and since
price-fixing directly affects competition, that type of conduct can be
singled out as illegal per se without violence to prior holdings.29
The Socony Vacuum decision crystallizes and simplifies a portion
of the antitrust law. In fact the Court has done what it has heretofore refrained from doingf and that is to single out one elementintentional price-fixing-as determinative of illegality. As a practical matter it is too much to impose upon the jury the onerous burden
of determining the reasonableness of prices in such a complicated setBesides it is futile since the reasonable
up as is here presented.3
price one day may be unreasonable the next. 1 To demand the "rule
The earlier cases such as United States v Trans-Missouri Freight
Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) and United States v Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) would declare all combinations
illegal. That all price fixing is unreasonable merely adds a few
more words to every opinion. The same result is reached either
way.
20 The opinion relies upon Trenton Potteries case which would mean
that the "rule of reason" yet prevails in the law and that price
fixing is merely unreasonable. But the Court states that "for over
forty years this Court has constantly and without deviation adhered to the principle that price fixing agreements are unlawful
per se . . ." Also in conducting that the rule of reason cases
are not apposite the Court states that "American Tobacco and
Standard Oil cases have no application to combinations operating
Cf. Mr. Chief Justice
directly on prices or price structures."
Hughes dissenting in Apex Hosiery v Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 514
(1940) where the opinion seems to indicate that the Socony Vacuum case overrules the "rule of reason."
27 See United States v Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927);
United States v Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (Argument for defendants).
28See Mr. Justice Roberts dissenting in United States v Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 254 (1940).
29
The Supreme Court in Trenton Potteries and Socony Vacuum cases
seem to reach this conclusion. In both cases the Court expressly
denies that any prior opinions are overruled. See Jaffe & Tobriner
supra note 5, 1164.
30 The trial court record consisted of more than 12,000 pages, in ad.
dition to over 1,000 exhibits. The trial lasted four months, during
all of which time the jury was kept sequestered and in the custody of United States Marshall. Even then the trial court gave
no consideration to the question of reasonableness of prices.
8' "The reasonableness of prices has no constancy due to the dynamic
quality of the business facts underlying price structures." United
States v Soeony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
25
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of reason", would emasculate the Sherman Act. The decision reaffirms in strong words the qualification of the Trenton Potteries case.
It seems proper to restrain private groups in their efforts to fix
prices when there is yet constitutional doubt as to the extent of the
government's ability to do the same.
A judicial expansion of the price-fixing concept shrinks the area
of application of the "rule of reason." Rather than decide the troublesome question of reasonableness involving economic valuations and
effect, the court can pronounce an activity price-fixing and automically apply the per se illegal rule. This is significant since the primary aim of most combination is to better economic returns. For
over a decade no integrated combination case has come before the Supreme Court.32 But if the dicta of the Socony Vacuum case indicates
future law the traditional distinction, between integrated and loose
3
The Court states that the
industrial combinations is discredited.8
"machinery employed by a combination for price-fixing purposes is
immaterial"34 and that any "combination which, tampers with price
85
structures is engaged in an unlawful activity."
Thus a finding that consolidation or merger was for price-fixing
purposes woul indicate illegality per se. As an economic matter,
however, will not the invalidation of such cooperative efforts as those
engaged in by the oil companies here invite integration through consolidation and merger? The principle of United States v U.S. Steel
C. rpso and United States v International Harvester Co.87 that integration of properties is legal has not as yet been overruled. But the
next step in antitrust development is to extend the illegal per se concept of price-fixing to integrated combination cases involving indirect
H. R. H.
price fixing.88
S2Weston supra note 12, at 42. A possible exception is that found in
Sugar Institute case.
8
aFor a discussion of the leading cases on integrated and loose combinations see Weston supra note 7, at 42.
84United States v Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
as United States v Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940L).
6251 U.S. 417 (1920). For a discussion of the Steel case see Handler,
Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws (1932) 32 Col.L.Rev.
179.
37 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
8s Suits to force the oil companies to divest themselves of certain types
of properties, such as pipe lines and tankers and marketing facilities, and to disintegrate companies so as to separate transportation and marketing from that of oil have apparently been deferred because of national defense. See Dep't of Justice Press
Release, August 1, 1940.
It has been pointed out that clear cut decisions are not found
in view of the complicated set-up of antitrust cases. Many variables of unequal importance must be appraised by the court in
each case. The changing attitude of the country toward the trust
problem and the changes in courts personnel has been reflected in
the decisions. See Handier supra note 36, at 179.

